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Burckhardt and Nietzsche on the Agōn:  
the dark luster of ancient Greece 
 
The discovery of the agonal mentality is widely recognized as 
one of Jacob Burckhardt’s two foremost contributions to the study 
of ancient Greece (the other being his thesis about the distinctive 
character of the Greek polis). The term refers to the Greeks’ strong 
commitment to competition as indeed not just an end itself, but the 
highest end available in human existence. The paradigmatic 
manifestation of the agonal spirit was athletic contest, but it took 
on a great variety of different forms and was eventually 
disseminated throughout all spheres of life, ranging from poetry 
to politics and from education to social entertainment. Over the 
years, several distinguished ancient historians have emphasized 
that Burckhardt’s thesis concerning the agonal mentality has stood 
the test of time.2  
                                                     
1 Tobias Joho is Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at the Department of Classics at 
the University of Bern in Switzerland. His book entitled Language and 
Necessity in Thucydides is forthcoming with Oxford University Press. He has 
also published scholarly articles on various aspects of Thucydides, on Jacob 
Burckhardt’s work on classical Athens, and on Goethe’s Elective Affinities.  
2 See Hans Schaefer, Staatsform und Politik: Untersuchungen zur griechischen 
Geschichte des 6. und 5. Jahrhunderts (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1932), 175-86; Victor 
Ehrenberg, “Das Agonale,” in Ost und West: Studien zur geschichtlichen 
Problematik der Antike (Brünn: Rohrer, 1935), esp. 65, 72-3, 94-6; Helmut 
Berve, “Vom agonalen Geist der Griechen,” in Gestaltende Kräfte der Antike 
(Munich: Beck, 1966), esp. 1, 18-9; Moses I. Finley, Ancient History: Evidence 
and Models (London: Chatto and Windus, 1985), 3; Oswyn Murray, editor’s 
introduction to The Greeks and Greek Civilization, by Jacob Burckhardt, trans. 
Sheila Stern (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998), xxxii, xli; idem, “Burckhardt and 
the Archaic Age,” in Jacob Burckhardt und die Griechen: Vorträge einer 
Internationalen Fachkonferenz in Freiburg i.Br., 1.-5. September 2004, ed. 
Leonhard Burckhardt and Hans-Joachim Gehrke (Basel: Schwabe, 2006), 
257. Some scholars accept Burckhardt’s emphasis on the strong influence of 
agonal mentality, but they are critical of the idea that it came to define the 
character of Greek politics: A. Heuss, “Die archaische Zeit Griechenlands als 
geschichtliche Epoche,” Antike und Abendland 2 (1946), 57n.20; Leonhard 
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Burckhardt’s Cultural History of Greece goes back to a course of 
lectures he delivered several times at the University of Basel from 
1872 onwards, right around the time he became acquainted with 
Friedrich Nietzsche, who had become professor of classical 
philology at Basel in 1869. Nietzsche had a strong interest in the 
lectures on Greek cultural history: he attended some of them in 
person, asked students to make their lecture notes available to him, 
and repeatedly discussed Greek matters with Burckhardt.3 Beyond 
their largely overlapping views about Greek culture and thought, 
they both took a critical stance vis-à-vis the rising age of modernity 
and the cultural deformations that, they believed, came in its wake. 
Burckhardt and Nietzsche deserve joint credit for their 
recognition of a distinctly Greek type of pessimism. They draw 
attention to the Greeks’ profound awareness of the misery and 
suffering of human existence, but they argued that this insight, far 
from inducing life-denying disgust, found its expression in serene 
and enchanting artistic form, which ultimately had a life-affirming 
effect.4 Attention to the distinctive ambiguity besetting Greek 
                                                     
Burckhardt, “Vom ‘Agon’ zur ‘Nullsummenkonkurrenz,’” Nikephoros 12 
(1999): 79, 92. 
3 See Felix Stähelin, editor‘s introduction to Griechische Kulturgeschichte, vol. 1, vol. 
8 of Jacob Burckhardt-Gesamtausgabe (Basel: Schwabe, 1930), xxiii-xxix. 
4 See Burckhardt, Griechische Kulturgeschichte (GK), II, 359-64 [95-9]; Nietzsche, 
Geburt der Tragödie, § 3, KSA I, 34-7. References to Burckhardt’s work are to 
the following edition: Jacob Burckhardt, Griechische Kulturgeschichte, 4 vols, 
(Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977). I explain why I cite this 
edition in Joho, “The Internal Commotion of Greek Culture: Jacob 
Burckhardt on the Defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War,” Ktèma 42 
(2017): 128n.2. Italicized numbers in square brackets refer to the abridged 
English translation of the Griechische Kulturgeschichte: The Greeks and Greek 
Civilization, ed. Oswyn Murray, trans. Sheila Stern (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1998). References to Nietzsche’s works are to Sämtliche Werke: Kritische 
Studienausgabe, 15 vols, ed. Mazzino Montinari and Giorgio Colli (Munich: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980). Nietzsche’s posthumously published 
essay “Homers Wettkampf,” originally written in 1872, will be our main 
reference point for his views on Greek competition. In citations of this work, 
italicized numbers in square brackets refer to the English translation by 
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culture, the indissoluble interaction of ennobling and terrifying 
forces, is Burckhardt’s and Nietzsche’s shared contribution to the 
study of Greek antiquity. Their shared interest in the ἀγών reflects 
this general aspect of their engagement with ancient Greece. In 
what follows, I will show that Burckhardt and Nietzsche agree that 
the agonal mentality infused Greek culture with a tremendous 
vitality, a force that was largely responsible for the rise of 
individualism and the Greeks’ outstanding cultural achievements. 
At the same time, Burckhardt and Nietzsche highlight that the 
relentless commitment to competition and exertion also had a dark 
underside. While they agree about this daemonic dimension, they 
differ considerably in their specific account, and their ultimate 
appraisal, of this aspect.  
The splendor of agonal Greece 
To appreciate the central importance that Burckhardt attaches 
to agōn, one only has to bear in mind the fact that he calls the epoch 
now designated as archaic the agonal age.5 While not restricted to 
this era, it was then, according to Burckhardt, that the agōn fully 
came to flourish and achieved its pure form (GK IV, 88 [165]). For 
Burckhardt, the central precondition for the rise of the agōn is the 
freedom, combined with equality, that prevailed among the 
aristocracies of archaic Greece (GK IV, 85 [163]): competition for 
the sake of assessing individual excellence could only take place in 
the absence of both despotic rule and of rigidly hierarchical 
society. Freedom was necessary because the high value assigned 
to individual achievement, the sine qua non for genuine 
competition, would not have been conceivable if a man’s worth 
had been determined, not by personal achievement, but by his 
fixed place in a strict social hierarchy. Moreover, without basic 
equality, at least among the aristocracy, people would have lacked 
peers of equal rank and ability, an indispensable ingredient if a 
genuine competition with open outcome was to take place.  
                                                     
Christa Davis Acampora in Nietzscheana 5 (1996): 1-8. On a few occasions, I 
have adapted the translation of specific passages.   
5 Murray, “Burckhardt and the Archaic Age,” 253. 
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The requirement of freedom shows why Burckhardt, and 
Nietzsche in his wake, took the agonal mentality to be distinctive 
of Greek culture. In a critique of Burckhardt’s thesis, Ingomar 
Weiler has argued that fondness of athletic competitions was not a 
unique feature of ancient Greece, and that other ancient societies, 
too, attached great value to athletic contests and made them the 
subject of some of their myths.6 However, the attitude that 
Burckhardt and Nietzsche found in the Greeks goes beyond a 
general liking of athletics and admiration for the victors: on their 
view, the Greeks alone considered victory in the essentially useless 
agonal contests to be the highest achievement of human beings, 
greater than any feat, for instance, in the spheres of war and 
politics. Only if competition is charged with this extreme degree of 
significance, and only if success raises a victorious individual in 
the eyes of the community to otherwise unattainable heights, does 
commitment to athletic excellence require freedom and become 
irreconcilable with a rigid social hierarchy.  
As a result of the Greeks’ extremely high regard for athletic 
competition, the agonal mentality came to affect all significant 
areas of Greek life and became one of the driving forces of Greek 
culture. Both Burckhardt and Nietzsche emphasize this ubiquity 
of the agonal mentality, each illustrating it by a favorite passage 
from extant Greek sources. Burckhardt (GK IV, 89-90 [166]) refers 
to Herodotus’ account of Cleisthenes of Sicyon, who searched a 
worthy groom for his daughter Agariste by inviting suitors from 
the various regions of Greece to present themselves for a 
competition; he tested them for a whole year in a comprehensive 
range of disciplines and activities, with a view to assessing their 
athletic and musical abilities as well as their general character 
(Herodotus, Histories 6.126-130). Nietzsche, in turn, cites Hesiod’s 
description of two types of strife, one good and one bad, in lines 
11-26 of the Works and Days (KSA I, 786 [3]). The good strife is a 
                                                     
6 Ingomar Weiler, Der Agon im Mythos (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1974), 272-313, esp. 310-3. For a defense of Burckhardt‘s 
and Nietzsche’s position against Weiler’s critique, see: Hartmut Schröter, 
Historische Theorie und geschichtliches Handeln: Zur Wissenschaftskritik 
Nietzsches (Mittenwald: Mäander, 1982), 107-8, 352n.85 
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pervasive competitive orientation, which pits all ranks of human 
beings against each other: for instance, not just singer against 
singer, but also beggar against beggar. Taken together, the two 
passages show that Burckhardt and Nietzsche regarded agōn as a 
pervasive organizing principle of Greek life. 
The third crucial feature that Burckhardt and Nietzsche jointly 
ascribe to the agōn is its effect of calling forth individual talent. Due 
to the constant urge to excel in direct contest with others and in a 
wide array of activities, the Greeks had a strong incentive to 
develop the full ambit of all their capacities to the highest degree.7 
In a memorable phrase, Burckhardt calls the agonal spirit “a 
motive power known to no other people—the general leavening 
element that, given the essential condition of freedom, proved 
capable of working upon the will and the potentialities of every 
individual” (GK IV, 84 [162]). Nietzsche agreed: “[E]very great 
Hellene passes on the torch of the contest; every great virtue sets 
afire new greatness” (KSA I, 788 [4])].  
The fourth central aspect of the agonal mentality stressed by 
both Burckhardt and Nietzsche, is the stimulation of a singular 
flourishing of the arts. Nietzsche draws a contrast between what 
he sees as a deep-seated modern distaste for personal rivalry as a 
source of artistic production and the Greek tendency to conceive 
of the artist exclusively in terms of direct competition with his 
peers (KSA I, 790-91 [6]). Greeks “know the artist only in personal 
conflict,” so that “where modern man senses the weakness of the 
work of art, the Hellene looks for the source of its highest power” 
(KSA I, 790 [6]). The modern aversion diagnosed by Nietzsche 
presumably originates from the suspicion that art, stimulated by 
the external impulse of rivalry will lack the purity of inner 
inspiration. Nietzsche implies that the withdrawal of the modern 
subjective artist into the inner self runs the risk of condemning art 
to solipsism and lack of urgency; by contrast, the Greek spirit of 
                                                     
7 A nice illustration of how the agōn led to the full development of innate 
potentials, and how it climaxed in outstanding individuals, is provided by 
Burckhardt’s reference to the report in Athenaeus of Alcibiades’s tour of the 
major regions of Greece (GK IV, 193 [231]). Athenaeus 12.534b [Kaibel]; 
Aelianus Varia Historia 4.15.  
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rivalry forged a link between artistic production and the vitalizing 
concern for self-affirmation. Burckhardt, in turn, stresses that the 
Greeks were unique among all ancient civilizations in forging a 
link between competition and the cultic sphere, in which the 
production of poetry and music was embedded. Through the 
infusion of Greek cult with agōn, competition came to dominate 
literary production: “[T]o a great extent the art of poetry develops 
under the determining influence of the agon” (GK IV, 113 [182]). 
Burckhardt cites the rise of tragedy, comedy, and a significant 
portion of choral lyric, all of which were produced in an agonal 
framework.  
The high regard for competition resulted in the organization 
of Greek education according to the agonal mentality (KSA I, 789 
[5]; GK IV, 115 [183]), which contributed to the establishment of a 
unified Greek culture. This aspect is important because Burckhardt 
and Nietzsche regarded the lack of such a vital and authoritative 
culture as one of the dire impoverishments that confront humanity 
under the conditions of modernity. Nietzsche remarks that Greek 
popular education considered it self-evident that “[e]very talent 
must develop by fighting” (KSA I, 789 [5]). Because education 
revolved around the most noble agonal pursuits (i.e. gymnastics 
as well as music and poetry), sophistication in these areas became 
widespread. As Burckhardt observes, Greek poets would not 
perform in public if they did not have a jury that would assess 
them, but this hardly ever posed a problem because, wherever 
they showed up, sophisticated judges quickly came forward.8 
While Burckhardt and Nietzsche fully agree on the 
pervasiveness and formative role of the agōn in Greek culture, they 
give different accounts of the influence of the agonal principle on 
the sphere of politics and war. For Burckhardt, the agōn in the 
pristine form of the archaic age was an unadulterated striving for 
excellence as pure end in itself. On Burckhardt’s view, lack of any 
practical purpose is the very definition of the agōn (GK IV, 85 [163]). 
However, in the fifth century the guiding lights of Greek 
                                                     
8 In support of this claim, Burckhardt cites Theocritus, where cowherds and 
woodcutters are depicted as adept in poetic judgment (GK IV, 114 [182]). 
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civilization shifted from athletic competition to domestic and 
foreign (i.e. inter-city) politics: the great triumphs of Athens in the 
Persian Wars had turned the attention of the entire Greek world to 
this arena (GK IV, 202-203 [238]). Despite their intensity, 
Burckhardt considered these political struggles “a false agon” (GK 
IV, 203 [238]) because the contestants did not seek political 
ascendancy as an end in itself, but as a source of material gain and 
self-interested advancement.9 
By contrast, several examples that Nietzsche cites to illustrate 
the nature of Greek competition come from the political realm. He 
even holds that the political instrument of ostracism had an agonal 
origin. Referring to the episode of the banishment of Hermodorus 
by the Ephesians, Nietzsche mentions that they resorted to this 
measure because, on their own admission, they did not want to 
have anyone among themselves who would be better than all 
others.10 From this explanation, Nietzsche draws the conclusion 
that the standard modern interpretation of ostracism (i.e. that it 
functioned to banish potential insurgents) misses its original 
purpose. Instead, Nietzsche thinks that its point was to maintain 
genuine competition among equally matched contestants. If an 
individual distinguished himself too much in the political contest, 
the game lost its appeal because the winner became predictable. 
Thus, the original purpose of ostracism was to keep the political 
contest vital and exciting, to function, as Nietzsche writes, not as 
“a safety valve” but as “a means of stimulation” (KSA I, 789 [5]). 
Whereas Burckhardt held that competition could no longer be 
genuine when it came to be about power and influence, Nietzsche 
thought that the Greeks’ commitment to competition was so strong 
that they were primarily concerned with competition for its own 
sake even when competing over political clout.   
                                                     
9 On Burckhardt’s account of the political transformation of the agonal principle, 
see Joho, “The Internal Commotion,” 137-8.  
10 The episode is transmitted in a fragment of Heraclitus: Diels/Kranz 22 B 121 = 
Strabo 14.1.25; Cicero Tuscalan Disputations 5.105. 
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Burckhardt on the dark side of the agonal spirit 
Already before Burckhardt, Ernst Curtius, the esteemed 
excavator of Olympia, had described the Greeks’ competitive 
mentality as a defining feature of Greek culture.11 Curtius, who 
stood in the unbroken tradition of German philhellenism, 
regarded competition as an unequivocally beneficent institution, a 
stimulus that tended to bring out the best in people. In marked 
contrast, Burckhardt broke entirely new ground as he highlighted 
several terrifying features of the agonal mentality. 
Weiler has pointed out that Burckhardt was the first to use the 
adjective “agonal” to describe the Greeks’ competitive frame of 
mind.12 By contrast, Curtius avoided it,13 probably because the 
Greek word ἀγών has some rather gloomy connotations. Moses 
Finley calls it “an untranslatable word, normally rendered by the 
pale ‘athletic competition’ or by ‘struggle,’ neither of which 
captures the overtones as well as its English descendant, 
‘agony.’”14 Helmut Berve takes a similar view: “The competition, 
which often was extremely dangerous for the contestants, required 
a maximum exertion of force, so that the word ‘agonia’ came to 
signify exertion or anxiety and the adjective ‘athlios,’ which was 
derived from ‘athlos,’ the word for contest, meant hardship and 
misery.”15 In choosing “agonal” as his preferred adjective, 
Burckhardt tries to capitalize on these connotations in order to 
underline his view of the ἀγών as, in Oswyn Murray’s words, “a 
dark and demonic power, as dangerous as it is creative.”16  
                                                     
11 Ernst Curtius, “Der Wettkampf,” in Alterthum und Gegenwart: Gesammelte Reden 
und Aufsätze, vol. 1 (Berlin: Hertz, 1875), 132-47. 
12 Ingomar Weiler, “ΑΙΕΝ ΑΡΙΣΤΕΥΕΙΝ: Ideologiekritische Bemerkungen zu 
einem vielzitierten Homerwort,” 1 (1975): 203.  
13 Curtius used the term “Wettkampf” (competition). Despite their divergent 
interpretations of ancient Greece, Curtius and Burckhardt esteemed each 
other. See: Karl Christ, Griechische Geschichte und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, 
Historia Einzelschriften 106 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996), 138-40; also Murray, 
“Burckhardt and the Archaic Age,” 251-3.  
14 Finley, Ancient History: Evidence and Models, 3.  
15 Berve, “Vom agonalen Geist,” 3 [my translation]. 
16 Murray “Burckhardt and the Archaic Age,” 253.  
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Burckhardt is most explicit about the daemonic underside of 
the agonal spirit when discussing its grim effect on the psychic 
constitution of the athletes: “No true happiness could result from 
the concentration of the whole life on a few seconds of terrible 
tension; the suspense must have meant anticlimax, or profound 
anxiety about the future, for those involved” (GK IV, 103 [175]). In 
this way, Burckhardt diagnoses a radical split running through the 
athletes’ existence: while bright luster and nearly superhuman 
glory attached themselves to victors at the great athletic contests, 
they also suffered from psychic deformation induced by pent up 
suspense and enervating tension. One must consider Burckhardt’s 
account against the backdrop of philhellenism’s cherished tenet 
that the Greeks achieved an ideal balance of mind and body, and 
that they integrated physical and mental powers in natural, 
seamless harmony.17 Burckhardt’s observation that the athletes’ 
splendid physical appearance went along with anguish and 
mental overextension runs directly counter to this notion.   
With the following anecdote recorded by Pausanias (6.8.4), 
Burckhardt illustrates the pointlessness that imperiled existence 
once advanced age prevented an athlete from participation in 
competition. After his retirement, a certain Timanthes, a former 
pancratiast, submitted himself to the daily exercise of bending a 
massive bow. Upon return from an extended trip, he found that he 
was no longer able to perform this exercise. In response, he lit a 
funeral pyre, placed himself on top of it, and burned himself alive 
(GK IV, 103-4 [175]). According to Burckhardt, the exaltation of 
competition risked stripping life of any possibility of satisfaction 
beyond the narrow confines established by success in the agōn.  
Weighing the sorrow of the many losers against the happiness 
of the few victors in the athletic competitions, Burckhardt arrives 
at the conclusion that, in sum, the unhappiness of the former vastly 
outweighed the bliss of the latter (GK II, 360 [96]). In addition, he 
                                                     
17 See, for instance, Ernst Curtius, “Die Kunst der Hellenen,” in Alterthum und 
Gegenwart, vol. 1, 83: “The notion of a harmonious development of spiritual 
and bodily nature has been first conceived and … actualized by the Greeks” 
[my translation]. 
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considers even the alleged happiness of the select few to be 
marred: he harbors doubts about the wisdom of a form of life 
whose overriding goal was the momentary experience of personal 
“elation” (“Hochgefühl,” GK II, 360 [96]) derived from the purely 
external standard set by the judgement of others. Thus, according 
to Burckhardt, the Greeks, whose exemplary happiness had been 
a favorite theme of philhellenism, in fact turned out to suffer, in 
large numbers, from unhappiness.18 Burckhardt considers 
precisely the agōn to be the source of widespread misery. 
Nietzsche on Hesiod’s good strife 
Just like Burckhardt, and unlike the idealist school of thought, 
Nietzsche is fully aware of the intense psychological states evoked 
by the agōn. On Nietzsche’s view, the agonal mentality incited 
fierce impulses in the contestants, producing a situation that has 
little in common with the ideal, propagated by philhellenism, of a 
happy harmony of soul. During his reflections on Hesiod’s bad 
and good strife, Nietzsche points out that the good strife, which is 
the origin of all competition, induces emotions of anger (κοτέει) 
and envy (φθονέει). He observes that “nothing separates the 
Greek world from ours as much as the coloring…of individual 
ethical concepts” (KSA I, 786 [3]). The Greeks, in marked contrast 
to the moderns, regarded seemingly negative impulses such as 
strife, anger, and envy as beneficial forces.  
Whereas Burckhardt thought that the violent impulses stirred 
up in competition contributed to widespread unhappiness, 
Nietzsche takes an entirely different view. He tries to reimagine 
from a first-person perspective how the Greeks experienced anger, 
envy, and strife: “Greek man is envious and does not feel this 
quality to be a blemish but the effect of a beneficent deity” (KSA, I, 
                                                     
18 The pride of place taken by the idea of Greek happiness is well captured by the 
beginning of Schiller’s poem The Gods of Greece: “Da ihr noch die schöne 
Welt regiertet / An der Freude leichtem Gängelband …” (= “Ye in the age 
gone by, / Who ruled the world … / In the light leading-strings of careless 
joy!”). In Friedrich Schiller, Sämtliche Gedichte, ed. Georg Kurscheidt, vol. 1 
of Werke und Briefe (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1992), 
162. For the English translation, see “The Gods of Greece,” https://www. 
poemhunter.com/poem/the-gods-of-greece/. 
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787 [3-4]). Instead of turning inward and dwelling on the 
emotional upheaval caused by strong impulses, the Greeks simply 
took them for granted: “Greek genius accepted the undisputable 
existence of this terrible drive and thought it justified” (KSA I, 785-
86 [2]). Far from being unsettled and aggrieved by aggressive 
emotions, suggests Nietzsche, the Greeks felt invigorated by their 
upsurge. Since the Greeks, unlike the moderns, were not given to 
inwardness and self-reflection, their main concern was not with 
how a specific impulse felt, but that one felt it. Burckhardt’s 
emphasis on the negative emotional effects of the agonal mentality 
would probably have struck Nietzsche as an instance of a 
distinctively modern sensitiveness. Nonetheless, Nietzsche admits 
that the Greeks’ competitive spirit had a dismal origin.  
In terms that closely recall the fundamental Dionysian insight 
as described in the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche writes that the 
Greeks of the pre-Homeric era recognized chaos, eternal flux, 
terror, suffering, and struggle as the core of the world and the 
fundamental basis of existence.19 Faced with the glimpse into this 
primordial abyss, however, the Greeks avoided the threat of 
world-denying disgust by saving themselves through the rise of 
the agonal mentality. Accepting conflict as part and parcel of the 
nature of existence, they transformed the harrowing principle of 
strife into a promotive force: the contained and organized strife of 
competition. According to Nietzsche, the agonal mentality is 
identical with Hesiod’s good strife: “Wettkampf” supersedes 
“Vernichtungskampf” (KSA I, 787 [3]).  
Nietzsche has packed a complex account of how the Greeks 
achieved this transformation into his short essay. They based the 
containment of primordial strife on the arousal of the individual’s 
desire for self-distinction. This paradox (containment through 
arousal) is central to Nietzsche’s account of the Greeks’ attempt to 
channel the explosive energy of strife. A concrete objective came 
into view, and the pursuit of individual distinction focused the 
previously blind and sprawling discharge of destructive energy. 
However, further modifications had to be applied to this clearly 
                                                     
19 Die Geburt der Tragödie, § 3, KSA I, 35-6.  
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demarcated pursuit in order to endow it with a stable form. The 
Greeks applied three regulatory mechanisms to primordial strife 
according to Nietzsche: (1) identification of self-distinction with 
the city’s interest; (2) encouragement of rivalry; (3) homogeneity 
between human and divine envy. All of these refinements of 
initially unbounded aggression had the dual purpose of 
simultaneously unleashing and curbing the force of strife. 
The first effort to promote the good strife begins with the 
realization that the discharge of energy through self-distinction 
requires freedom: according to Nietzsche, “individuals were freer 
in antiquity” than their modern counterparts (KSA I, 790 [6]). As 
Herman Siemens has pointed out, “freedom” in the relevant sense 
consists, not in the negative freedom from any kind of external 
inference, but in the positive capacity to unfold innate potentials.20 
Siemens has also observed that this positive conception of freedom 
requires “tangible goals” and realization in action.21 Both of these 
requirements must be fulfilled if freedom is not to remain a purely 
formal and empty capacity. First, one must get clear about the goal 
in pursuit of which one will actualize one’s capacity for freedom. 
However, the mere identification of such an aim is not enough. For 
instance, what it really takes to perform at an athletic contest can 
only be appreciated when one actually goes through the training, 
travels to the site of the contest, and meets the challenge of the 
competition. Only through the leap from vague conception to 
fulfilment in action, can dormant potential realize itself, acquire a 
tangible shape, and infuse existence with energy. 
This picture raises two questions: what goals are worth 
pursuing, and how can people become aware of them? According 
to Nietzsche, the Greeks’ answer to the first question was that 
these goals were to be found in a vibrant, exhilarating culture; the 
answer to the second was that the highest ambition of the polis was 
to commit its members to the pursuit of the objectives provided by 
                                                     
20 Herman Siemens, “Nietzsche contra Liberalism on Freedom,” in A Companion to 
Nietzsche, ed. Keith. Ansell-Pearson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 443. 
21 Siemens, “Nietzsche contra Liberalism,” 443. 
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culture: “The ‘useless’ waste of energy (in any kind of agon) as an 
ideal to which the state aspires (in opposition to the Romans)” (NL 
1888: 8 [15], KSA X, 336). As Hartmut Schröter points out, culture 
in the relevant sense consists of “activities which can have their 
purpose in themselves: in which existence fulfills itself.”22 Thus, 
applied to ancient Greece, the term culture refers to athletic 
competition as well as the arts. By considering the promotion of 
culture as its highest ideal, the city came to equate the individual’s 
distinction in intrinsically purposeful activity with the 
advancement of the city’s own glory (KSA I, 789-90 [5-6]): a citizen 
could do the city no greater service than achieving victory in 
competition. In binding its citizens to these ideals, the polis offered 
them the inherently valuable objectives without which positive 
freedom had to remain chimerical. This identification of the 
purposes of the individual with those of the city seemed natural 
enough because, as Nietzsche could learn from Burckhardt, the 
Greeks conceived of the city as a living organism and of the 
citizens as its integral components (GK I, 74 [55]). 
On Nietzsche’s account, the identification between individual 
excellence and interest of the city functioned simultaneously as a 
stimulus and a check: “with this his selfishness was enflamed, with 
this it was bridled and restrained” (KSA I, 790 [6]). The desire for 
self-distinction was curbed because the contestants, receiving the 
goals indispensable for freedom from the city, also had to accept 
the restricting rules that likewise came from the city. This 
acceptance was necessary because a breakdown of the city would 
have been tantamount to the breakdown of the institution that 
made intrinsically worthwhile pursuits possible. Siemens draws 
attention to the paradoxical character of Nietzsche’s account: 
“Where the individual sees himself as a mere instrument for the 
good of the community, he is free; to be free, an individual’s 
actions must be under the constraints, the pressure imposed by the 
interests of the community.”23 While the paradox is genuine, it is 
important to realize that, by inciting competition, the city did not 
                                                     
22 Schröter, Historische Theorie und geschichtliches Handeln, 112 [my translation].  
23 Siemens, “Nietzsche contra Liberalism,” 442-3.  
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exploit the individual for its exogenous utilitarian purposes, be 
they economic or military. Instead, according to Nietzsche, it 
provided the condition necessary for individual self-realization. In 
this connection, Nietzsche would probably not deny Burckhardt’s 
point that the incitement of competition frequently involved 
sorrow and hardship for the individual. However, on Nietzsche’s 
view, this is the price to be paid if one wants culture to be capable 
of charging existence with meaning. 
The second, obviously related, measure by which the Greeks 
turned strife into a beneficial force was the promotion of rivalry. 
What stands behind it is the realization that action essentially 
requires obstacles. According to Nietzsche, the indispensability of 
obstacles for human self-development was the fundamental 
insight that separates Greek pedagogy from modern educational 
ideals: “Every talent must develop by fighting” (KSA I, 789 [5]).24 
The idea that rivalry is necessary for action is an intensification of 
the aforementioned notion that self-realization requires the 
imposition of goals by the city. The common denominator is the 
thought that action cannot take place in the absence of certain 
external factors. Awareness of goals is by itself insufficient to call 
forth action and, via action, self-realization. Taken by themselves, 
goals have an abstract and remote character. It takes the challenge 
of a rival for aspiration to gain traction. The rival adds a personal 
element to the relationship between the individual and his or her 
goal; it makes the relationship between goal and agent compelling.  
In rivalry, too, the element of stimulation is complemented by 
a containing mechanism. The obstacles that rivals put in the way 
of a free discharge of energy provide a reference point for the 
individual’s striving. The rival functions as a model: by desiring to 
outdo him, the contender wants to surpass the specific benchmark 
that his opponent has set. In addition, the permanent challenge by 
others requires each contestant to prove himself constantly anew. 
                                                     
24 Siemens, “Nietzsche contra Liberalism,” 445, unpacks this claim as follows: 
“[E]ach capacity can only become what it is through antagonistic striving 
against others … [F]ree action needs the resistance of others as both a 
stimulant and a limit on the forms it can take.” 
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It will invariably happen that on different occasions different 
contenders come out first. In this way, the obstacle set up by rivals 
forestalls the excess of personal presumption. Burckhardt’s 
example of Agariste’s Athenian suitor who danced away his 
victory provides a nice illustration of this threat: inebriated by his 
success, the Athenian puts on a grotesque dance performance 
which offends the standards of aesthetic propriety (GK IV, 147-48 
[205]). However, because he is up against competitors who observe 
the rules of the game, this transgression can immediately be 
penalized, and the sought-after bride goes to a competitor. Thus, 
rivalry, too, functions both as a stimulus and a constraint 
according to Nietzsche.  
A third regulatory mechanism of the Greeks’ agonal mentality 
was the notion of divine envy. Nietzsche observes that the Greeks 
“felt” envy “to be … the effect of a beneficent deity” (KSA I, 787 [3-
4]). Nietzsche’s phrasing deserves careful attention: when 
experiencing envy, the Greeks “feel” that a divine force has 
entered them. Envy is not taken to be a private and purely internal 
feeling, it is a universal force and has a divine origin outside of the 
human being. Envy, and the rivalry it induces, therefore, must not 
be repressed but welcomed. At the same time, Nietzsche 
emphasizes that the Greeks placed an absolute ban on the human 
desire to rival the gods lest they attract divine envy. He observes 
that just this one time, the Greeks did not take up the gauntlet. 
Instead, they practiced moderation and tried to contain their own 
splendor in order not to offend the god. This act of submission did 
not alienate human beings from the gods (KSA I, 787 [4]). “Because 
he [sc. Greek man] is envious, he also feels, at every excess … the 
envious eyes of a god resting on him” (KSA I, 787 [4]).  
The Greeks viscerally felt that the envy they experienced was 
a divine gift: an enlivening force that forged a close link between 
themselves and the gods. They conceived of their gods in 
Burckhardt’s words, as “ideal humans” (GK III, 19).25 In this way, 
the gods became the ennobling embodiment of natural human 
instincts. The Greeks held natural impulses to be sacred: when 
                                                     
25 Cf. Christian Meier, Politik und Anmut (Berlin: Siedler, 1985), 27. 
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feeling sexual passion, they took themselves to be affected by the 
power of Aphrodite, and when experiencing drunkenness, they 
thought Dionysus had infused them with his power.26 Denial of 
the sacredness of the gods would be to deny the sacredness of the 
Greeks’ own vital inclinations. Thus, defiance of divine envy, far 
from being an act of self-aggrandizement, would in fact amount to 
self-abnegation. In this way, the divine origin and justification of 
envy produced the same effect as the identification of the agōn with 
the ideals of the polis and the promotion of personal rivalry: it 
simultaneously activated and curbed the desire for self-distinction.  
While he admires the Greeks’ transformation of strife into a 
productive force, Nietzsche also makes clear that the equilibrium 
between order and primordial chaos was bound to be precarious. 
In the political arena in particular, it was always possible that one 
contestant might get so far ahead of all his rivals that further 
competition effectively became pointless. In this case, the 
consequences were invariably dire: a relapse to “that pre-Homeric 
abyss, a horrible ferocity of hate and desire to annihilate” (KSA I, 
791 [6]). With reference to Miltiades’s transformation after 
Marathon, Nietzsche illustrates that Greeks who had emancipated 
themselves from the contest displayed a fatal inclination to indulge 
in cruelty, debauchery, and megalomania. He says that this 
regression happened all too frequently: “when a great personality, 
through a tremendously splendid deed, is suddenly removed from 
the contest” (KSA I, 791 [6]). This passage implies that rivalry took 
precedence over the other two regulatory mechanisms dedicated 
to the promotion of good strife; once rivalry was out of the picture, 
the remaining two factors were not strong enough to contain the 
baneful potential of strife. Whereas the identification between 
individual glory and common good and the fear of divine envy 
involved the acknowledgment of firm boundaries, the element of 
rivalry turned on a free play of forces. Thus, the least stable of the 
three regulatory mechanisms was the only really effective one. For 
                                                     
26 On this notion of the divine, see David K. O’Connor, Plato’s Bedroom: Ancient 
Wisdom and Modern Love (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2015), 4-9.  
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all that it had to commend itself in Nietzsche’s eyes, the Greeks’ 
response to the equivocalness of strife was not without fatal flaw.  
Nietzsche and Burckhardt vis-à-vis the legacy of philhellenism 
While the agōn could not permanently stabilize the destructive 
force of strife, Nietzsche nonetheless thinks that competition 
enabled the Greeks, as long as things went well, to strike a balance 
between the natural predisposition towards aggressive self-
expression and the necessity to curb this impulse. In this way, 
Nietzsche’s account of the agōn is in line with one of the central 
tenets of philhellenism: the idea that the Greeks’ signal feature was 
their exemplary capacity to achieve balance and harmony between 
opposite dispositions. On this view, antithetical capacities, far 
from cancelling each other out, achieve a harmonious unity by 
entering into a dynamic relationship that results in mutual 
intensification. The relevant dispositions, which seem like polar 
opposites, resemble complementary colors whose juxtaposition 
likewise has the effect of heightening the vibrancy of them both.  
On several occasions in “Homer’s Competition,” Nietzsche 
describes the effect of the agōn according to the philhellenic model 
just outlined. The contestants were to “incite each other to action 
while keeping each other within the limits of measure” (KSA I, 789 
[5]). While the repetition of the phrase “each other” underlines the 
aspect of mutual intensification, the antithesis between “action” 
and “limits of measurem” as well as between “inciting” and 
“keeping within,” reflects the idea of polarity. The same analysis 
applies to Nietzsche’s observation that every Greek wished to 
benefit his city through victory at one of the great contests: “with 
this his selfishness was enflamed, with this it was bridled and 
restrained” (KSA I, 790 [6]). Compare this with the notebook entry 
about the benefit of contest: “Competition unleashes the 
individual, while at the same time restraining it in accordance with 
eternal laws” (NL 1871/72: 16 [22], KSA VII, 402). In both passages, 
one and the same institution functions both as a spur and a rein 
(“enflamed” vs. “bridled and restrained;” “unleashes” vs. 
“restraining”), thus achieving unity between the antithetical 
powers of stimulation and containment.   
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Here, Nietzsche draws on a theme that has deep roots in the 
tradition of German philhellenism that includes Friedrich 
Schiller,27 Wilhelm von Humboldt,28 Friedrich Schlegel,29 and 
G.W.F. Hegel.30 All of these writers provide evidence for the notion 
that the Greeks achieved a seamless integration of capacities that 
normally tend to be at odds with each other: natural simplicity and 
cultural refinement (Schiller and Humboldt), realism and 
imaginativeness (Humboldt), ferociousness and gentleness 
(Schlegel), organic rootedness in custom and individualism 
(Hegel). In claiming that competition induced both vital energy 
and restraint in the Greeks, Nietzsche is an heir of philhellenic 
idealism; however, the forces unleashed in strife according to 
Nietzsche evidently have a harsher and more explosive cast than 
one typically finds in notions of Greek harmony. Whereas the 
idealist thinkers tend to emphasize Greek gentleness and describe 
the harmony evinced by Greek culture as a midpoint between 
extremes,31 Nietzsche avoids language that bears connotations of 
mildness, balance, concord, and the golden mean. Instead, he 
emphasizes the dynamic interaction of adversarial impulses, 
whose unity, as we have seen, always remains precarious.  
                                                     
27 F. Schiller, Über Anmut und Würde, in Theoretische Schriften, ed. Rolf-Peter Janz, 
vol. 8 of Werke und Briefe (Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker, 1992), 334. 
28 W. v. Humboldt to F.A. Wolf, December 1, 1792, in Briefe, vol. 2, ed. Philipp 
Mattson (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015), 107. W. von Humboldt to F. Schiller, 
November 6, 1795, in Briefe, vol. 3, ed. Mattson (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), 
131. 
29 F. Schlegel, Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier,  in Studien zur Philosophe und 
Theologie, ed. Ernst Behler and Ursula Struc-Oppenberg, vol. 8 of Kritische 
Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, ed. Ernst Behler (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1975), 
263. 
30 G.W.F Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), 2.25. 
31 See for instance: G.E. Lessing, Laokoon, ed. Wilfried Barner (Frankfurt: 
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2007), 14; W. von Humboldt, “Ueber den 
Charakter der Griechen, die idealische und historische Ansicht desselben,” 
in Paralipomena, vol. 7.2 of Wilhelm von Humboldts Werke, ed. Albert 
Leitzmann (Berlin: Behr, 1908), 610; A. W. Schlegel, Vorlesungen über 
dramatische Kunst und Literatur: part 1, vol. 5 of Kritische Schriften und Briefe, 
ed. Edgar Lohner (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1966), 26. 
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For all his admiration for Greek culture, Burckhardt took a 
more skeptical line than Nietzsche with regard to the agōn: his 
diagnosis of a split between external splendor and internal 
deformation dispenses with the idea that the Greeks achieved 
balance between antithetical inclinations. He thought that the 
agonal spirit did not just make life among the Greeks more vibrant, 
but that it simultaneously caused widespread unhappiness. This 
awareness of contradictory aspects, sharpened to the point of 
paradox, is typical of Burckhardt’s ironic outlook, which often 
manifests itself in a reluctance to reduce the many-sidedness of 
historical experience to straightforward unequivocalness. To 
borrow a phrase used by Karl Reinhardt of the representation of 
Greek victory in the Agamemnon of Aeschylus, Burckhardt 
juxtaposes image against counter-image32: recognizing two sides 
of the agonistic principle (obverse and reverse, one uplifting and 
the other horrifying), he accepts that both of them belong together 
and that both are genuine and significant, but he does not see them 
dovetail in an overarching harmony. Nietzsche, despite his anti-
classical willingness to endorse some of the harsh evaluations that 
he finds in the Greeks, is more inclined than Burckhardt to accept, 
albeit in altered form, the core belief of classicism. 
Conclusion 
For the most part, Burckhardt’s and Nietzsche’s accounts of 
agōn in Greek life run along similar lines. They differ, however, in 
their evaluation of the agonal spirit: whereas on Burckhardt’s view 
its violent and destructive side was never far away and always 
afflicted the inner life of the Greeks, Nietzsche thought that the 
dire excess inherent in strife was contained by the agōn, and that it 
only reared its ugly head when competition broke down.  
This divergence has much to do with a basic difference in 
outlook. In all his historical works, Burckhardt was sensitive to the 
personal suffering of the losers and the countless anonymous 
victims of the course of history. In the final section of his so-called 
Reflections on World History, he contrasts the cult of great men with 
                                                     
32 Karl Reinhardt, Aischylos als Regisseur und Theologe (Bern: Francke, 1949), 80-1 
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a general indifference towards the victims of history: “Adopting 
an attitude of marked indifference, people treat the suffering of 
countless individuals as a ‘passing misfortune;’” […] “By and 
large, the proponents of this view enjoy an upbringing and way of 
life that rest entirely on circumstances attained at such cost, and so 
they practice leniency.”33 Based on Burckhardt’s inclination to take 
suffering seriously, his conviction that the agonal mentality caused 
widespread unhappiness carries considerable weight. By contrast, 
the question of individual suffering is of no great importance to 
Nietzsche. For him, the central question was what it took for a 
culture to be vital, spirited, and a breeding ground for great human 
achievement—in other words, all those things that he found 
missing in modernity, Germany in particular.34 On Nietzsche’s 
view, an age that assigns the highest value to individual comfort 
and security may be quite successful in reducing suffering, but it 
cannot simultaneously hope to unleash the highest of human 
potentials. In its turn, it will suffer from its own drawbacks: 
shallowness, loss of striving, pettiness, apathy, depression.  
Nietzsche was on a mission to search for ways to overcome 
the modern malaise, to revitalize life, and to fend off the specter of 
nihilism. As Rüdiger Safranski points out, Nietzsche’s intellectual 
engagement with ancient Greece became part of this quest, and he 
was willing to affirm the exemplarity of the Greeks if they could 
show him what a culture that was genuinely alive might look 
like.35  
                                                     
33 Jacob Burckhardt, Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen, text established by Jacob 
Oeri, ed. Peter F. Ganz, in vol. 10 of Jacob Burckhardt Werke: Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe (Basel: Schwabe, 2000), 532 [my translation].  
34 See for instance Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen I: David Strauss, § 1, KSA I, 162-3: 
“We must be dealing with a confusion when people talk about the victory 
of German education and culture, a confusion caused by the fact that 
Germany has lost any genuine notion of culture. Culture is above all unity 
of artistic style in all manifestations of a people’s life” [my translation]. 
35 R. Safranski, Nietzsche: Biographie seines Denkens (Munich: Hanser, 2000), 62-3. 
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Burckhardt largely agreed with Nietzsche that modernity was 
well on its way to producing a cultural and spiritual wasteland,36 
and that ancient Greece provided the counter image of a vibrant 
civilization, capable of endowing life with festive splendor and 
significance.37 As Lionel Gossman wrote, Burckhardt’s goal in 
delivering the lectures on the cultural history of Greece was the 
wish to uphold, to the extent possible, the continuity of “Bildung, 
the formation of thoughtful and cultivated human beings and 
citizens through reconnection with a past that is part of who we 
presently are.”38 Thus, Burckhardt, no less than Nietzsche, 
considered it part of his task to counteract the destructive effects 
of modernity and to promote cultural ideals, but his aspirations 
were more modest: the preservation of some sense of cultural 
continuity and historical awareness, as opposed to a 
comprehensive revitalization of culture.  
In his quest for cultural renewal, Nietzsche was always on the 
lookout for what he considered to be genuine educators, great 
individuals such as Schopenhauer, Wagner, or Goethe, who might 
be able to open up new horizons of existential significance. Only 
with this concern in mind, it is possible to appreciate the full 
weight of the following quotation from Twilight of the Idols, one of 
Nietzsche’s last works: “Educators are lacking, if we disregard the 
                                                     
36 On Burckhardt’s and Nietzsche’s shared skepticism vis-à-vis modernity, see 
Richard Sigurdson, Jacob Burckhardt’s Social and Political Thought (U. of 
Toronto Press, 2004), 216. 
37 Burckhardt’s evocation of the atmosphere prevailing at the Olympian Games 
gives vivid expression to the luster of archaic Greek culture: “All this [sc. 
the physical discomfort involved in travelling to Olympia] was made up for 
by the tremendous mood of exaltation which prevailed there. [A]fter the 
separate contests are done with, the lovely light of the mild moon shines 
down and the whole area resounds with songs in praise of the victors … 
Before this peaceful conclusion went an experience of tension exceeding 
anything we know from our modern race meetings, amidst a crowd of 
spectators all violently excited and showing great expertise in the detail of 
the various competitions. What is more, the setting was a magnificent site 
filled with works of art” (GK IV, 106 [177]). 
38 L. Gossman, Basel in the Age of Burckhardt (U. of Chicago Press, 2000), 313.  
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most exceptional of exceptions, the first prerequisite of education: 
hence the decline of German culture. One of those rarest 
exceptions is my venerable friend Jacob Burckhardt in Basel: it is 
to him above all that Basel owes its preeminence in humaneness.”39 
Despite their widely different educational ambitions, Nietzsche 
looked to Burckhardt as one of those rarest of creatures: a true 
educator.40 
 
                                                     
39 Götzendämmerung, “Was den Deutschen abgeht,” § 5, KSA VI, 107. 
40 I wish to thank Christoph Eucken, Heather Reid, and Christina Nurawar Sani, 
from whose advice this paper has profited substantively. Further thanks are 
due to the participants at Fonte Aretusa’s conference on the agōn for their 
questions and comments. All remaining mistakes are my sole responsibility.  
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